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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE C. BLONQUIST, et al, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
Case No. 
VS
* ' 13160 
TROY BLONQUIST, et al, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E N A T U R E O F 
T H E CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiffs-respondents, 
George G. Blonquist, La rry Don Wright, Keith Blon-
quist and their wives against defendants-appellants, 
Troy Blonquist, Grace Blonquist, Justine Blonquist 
and Kenneth Blonquist to have a road passing over these 
parties' property declared a public road by dedication 
and to recover damages for the obstruction of said road. 
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DISPOSITION I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
The lower court found that the road in question, 
the South Fork of Chalk Creek Road, from its junction 
with State Route 133 up to the Newton-Oswald Gate, 
was dedicated to public use and a public thoroughfare 
and awarded the plaintiffs $500 in general damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants ask that the decision of the lower court 
be reversed, that the part of the South Fork of Chalk 
Creek Road in dispute be declared a private road from 
the Blonquist Gate up to the Newton-Oswald Gate, 
and that respondents not be entitled to any damages 
but be required to bear the costs of this litigation. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The South Fork of Chalk Creek Road is a road 
which from its junction with State Route 133 passes 
over the land of the parties to this litigation. An early 
survey of this land area made by the Bureau of Land 
Management indicates that a road existed from the 
junction with Route 133 to a short distance from the 
Blonquist Gate. However, the disputed part of Chalk 
Creek Road was not on the plat at this time. (Abstract 
33) From the time that this land was patented the 
ownership of the land over which the road passes was 
2 
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for the most part in the Blonquist family. Testimony 
at trial indicated that the county had helped maintain 
the road for some years. However, testimony also re-
vealed that the road had been repaired and maintained 
over the years by private landowners, appellants in 
particular. (Abstract 15, 16, 37-43, 50, 51) Various 
gates have been placed across the road as it passes over 
the parties' properties up to other privately owned land. 
One of the first gates encountered by a traveler is the 
Blonquist Gate placed across the road to control live-
stock and travel over a half century ago. (Abstract 47) 
After the Blonquist Gate, the next gate is the Newton-
Oswald Gate. The road between the Blonquist Gate 
and the Newton-Oswald Gate is part of Chalk Creek 
Road in dispute. Testimony at trial showed that a 
"private property-no trespassing sign" had been placed 
on the Blonquist Gate for over forty years and that 
the gate at various times was locked. (Abstract 7, 
37, 48) 
The South Fork of Chalk Creek Road has no 
importance as an access to government or publicly 
owned land. (Abstract 53, 53, 57, 58, 60, 61) The 
land abutting the road besides being privately owned 
has little use for anything other than limited farming 
and grazing. (Abstract 62, 63) Thus, the road is used 
primarily by the area landowners as an access to their 
property. (Abstract 22, 30-32, 46, 59) Other people 
have used the road with the permission implied or ex-
press of the Blonquists. For a number of years the road 
was used as an access to an airplane beacon, and for 
3 
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such use the Blonquists were paid a rental fee. (Abstract 
18, 19) The road was used with the permission of the 
Blonquists to haul timber at one time. (Abstract 8, 
9, 14) Area landowners or lessors, again with the im-
plied or express consent of the Blonquists, have used 
the road to drive cattle or sheep. (Abstract 5, 21-28, 
46) Testimony indicated that some fishermen with 
permission to fish on the private lands in the area, were 
permitted to use the road at times. (Abstract 10, 23) 
More frequent use ofthe road was made by hunters 
who paid the Blonquists a fee to pass through the 
Blonquist Gate or who, belonging to the Echo-Chalk 
Creek Range Owners Protective Association, upon 
purchasing a permit were allowed to use the road. 
(Abstract 7, 16, 17, 44, 45, 60) 
The present litigation developed as a result of the 
appellants' desire to maintain control of the access to 
the South Fork of the Chalk Creek Road beyond the 
Blonquist Gate. Over the years there have been argu-
ments as to whether or not this part of the road was 
public. The County, while expending funds on the 
road and listing it on their maps as a County road, 
admitted that the designation of the road as a County 
road was not done by any legal process (Abstract 2-5) 
Area landowners had in the past questioned the road's 
status as a County or public road. (Abstract 29) And, 
County funds had been spent on this road as well as 
other roads in the area not as County roads but as 
private roads to accommodate the area landowners. 
(Abstract 13, 14, 34, 35) 
4 
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Q. But you did authorize funds to be spent on 
that road? 
A. Yes, that's right. But not as a County road. 
Q. Not as a County road? 
A. Not as a County raod. We have spent money 
on other roads, too, private roads. (Abstract 
34, 35) 
Another source of contention between the parties 
resulted from Summit County tearing down the Blon-
quist Gate and placing a cattle guard across the road. 
To try and limit the injuries to their livestock as a result 
of getting caught in the cattle guard, the appellants 
started construction of a fence. Posts were placed 
along the road as it approached the cattle guard to 
help channel the livestock and prevent crowding. These 
posts never obstructed the road as shown in plaintiff's 
exhibit number Twenty-one. However, due to com-
plaints from the respondents the fence construction 
was halted and never completed. At trial respondents 
alleged damages to their property as a result of these 
fence posts. I t was alleged that the posts made it more 
difficult for them to back out of their driveway and 
that the posts hindered efforts to plow snow off the 
road. Appellants on the other hand claimed damages 
against the County as a result of tearing down their 
gate and putting in the cattle guard. I t is important 
to note that the disputed part ofthe South Fork of 
Chalk Creek Road is from 15 to 20 feet in width, 
5 
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except for a small section by the removed Blonquist 
Gate and present guard, which is 44 feet in width. 
P O I N T I 
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N F I N D I N G 
T H A T T H E D I S P U T E D PORTION O F T H E 
S O U T H FORK OF C H A L K C R E E K ROAD I S 
A P U B L I C R I G H T O F W A Y AND ROAD. 
The lower court found that the Chalk Creek Road 
extending from State Route 133 to the Newton-Oswald 
gate, a distance of nearly three and one-half miles, 
was a public right-of-way. In order for it to be a public 
right-of-way, the road could have existed when the land 
over which it passes was owned by the United States 
government. Then, when such land was acquired by 
a private owner from the government, if no objection 
was made to the public road, the private owner was 
thereafter barred from asserting any damages and the 
road was deemed abandoned or dedicated to the public. 
Utah Code Ann. # 27-12-92 (1953). 
I n case of a failure by such person so acquiring 
title to public lands to assert his claim for dam-
age as aforesaid for three monthse from the time 
he shall have received a patent to such lands, he 
shall thereafter be barred from asserting or re-
covering any damages by reason of such public 
highway, and the same shall remain open. Id. 
In the present case, the disputed part of Chalk 
Creek Road was not on the maps when the land was 
acquired by the private owner from the United States 
6 
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government. (Abstract 33) Thus, the road did not 
become a public right-of-way as a result of Utah 
Code Ann. 27-12-92 or the statutes which preceded 
it. This means that in order for the road to now be 
considered a public right-of-way it must have either 
been acquired by the government under the Eminent 
Domain authority, Utah Code Ann. # 78-34-1 et seq. 
(1953) or it must have at one time been a private road 
which was then dedicated and abandoned to the public 
under Utah Code Ann. 27-12-89 (1953). Since there 
has been no exercise of the Eminent Domain authority 
the lower court concluded that the road was a public 
right-of-way as a rseult of Utah Code Ann. 27-12-89 
(1953), which reads: 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedi-
cated and abandoned to the use of the public 
when it has been continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
Appellants submit that competent evidence has not 
been presented to support the conclusion that the dis-
puted portion of Chalk Creek Road was dedicated to 
the public. 
In order for a dedication to occur, "there must 
be a concession intentionally made (by the owner) 
which may be proved by declarations or by acts, or 
may be inferred from circumstances." Morris v. Blunt, 
49 Utah 243, 244, 161 P . 1127, 1130 (1916). Although 
no formal ceremony is necessary, there are three deci-
sive requirements which must be proved to show dedi-
cation. First, there must be actual public use of the 
7 
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highway. Second, the land owner must appear to know 
of the use. And third, he must have intended to grant 
the right of way to the public. Id. All these requisite 
elements were never proven by the respondents. In 
fact the evidence presented, according to Utah law, 
supports a finding contrary to that of dedication. 
The respondents have failed to show that there 
was actual use of the highway by the public for the 
required ten year period. The standard used to deter-
mine ift here was such use is: 
"Was there sufficient evidence by competent 
testimony to show clear and convincing evidence, 
that the public generally, not just a few having 
their own special and private interests in the 
road, had used the road continuously for ten 
years. Peterson v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 
P.2d 545, 546, 547, (1968). 
The omission of such evidence by the respondents was 
no doubt due to the fact that there was no "public" 
use of the highway but only use by those with "special 
and private interests" and those who had the permis-
sion of the appellants. (Abstract 22-28, 30-32, 45, 46, 
59) The reason for which there is a lack of public 
interest in using the road is found by examining the 
land surrounding the road and to which the road leads. 
All this abutting land is privately owned. (Abstract 
52, 53, 57, 58, 61) Thus, it is not a necessary access to 
public lands used for hunting, fishing, picnicing, etc., 
as was the case in Choumos v. Bell, 21 Utah 2d 164, 
442 P.2d 926 (1968). In order to practice any recre-
8 
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ation on the land surrounding the Chalk Creek Road, 
permission of the land-owners was and is required. 
(Abstract 7, 16, 17, 44, 45, 54, 59, 60) Appellants 
submit that this distinction should be observed in the 
present case as it was in the Chournos case. In Chournos 
two roads were claimed to have been dedicated to the 
public. The first road was a necessary access to public 
lands and was extensively used by hunters and fisher-
men. The second road, however, was "punctuated only 
on occasion by permissive use." The Court held that 
the first road was a public right-of-way while the second 
road was still a private road. Id. at 166, 928. The 
Chournos case illustrates the principle that where there 
is no public need to use a road it should not be deemed 
dedicated to the public as a result of infrequent per-
missive use. Appellants submit that the disputed part 
of Chalk Creek Road has no value to the public, that 
it leads to and is abutted by only private property, and 
that the use thereof has been only with the permission 
of the landowners for private reasons. And therefore, 
just as the second road in the Chournos case, it should 
not be deemed dedicated to the public. 
Respondents may argue that the road was and is 
used by area property owners to get to their land and 
therefore has public use. However, the law clearly 
states that "such property owners cannot be con-
sidered members of the public generally, as that term 
generally is used in this area." Peterson v. Combe, supra 
at 377, 546. 
9 
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Appellants recognize that the road had been used 
by government officials to reach an airplane beacon 
and that it has been graded in recent years by the 
County. (Abstract 18, 19) However, such use was with 
the permission of the appellants. Again the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that "Such circumstances 
hardly . . . show public use." Id. at 380, 548. In 
Peterson v. Combe, supra, the road in question had 
been graded and maintained by the County. I t had 
been used by the Weber Basin Water District and by 
resolution had been made a county road, it had been 
used by the Fish and Game Department, and it had 
been used by area landowners. Such use was held 
insufficient to show a public use and dedication of the 
road. In Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 
426 (1964), the fact that a road had been worked by 
the county, claimed by county employees to be a county 
road, and indicated on county maps as a county road, 
was held to be insufficient to make the road public. 
In the present case then, the fact that the County had 
done work on the road is not a determination that the 
road is a public road as the above mentioned cases 
illustrate. In fact, testimony at trial shows that work 
was often done by the County on private roads at the 
request of landowners. (Abstract 13, 14, 34, 35) The 
County itself was undecided as to whether the road 
was public or private (Abstract 29) And, with respect 
to maintenance of the road, testimony showed that 
private efforts had in fact been responsible for much 
of the maintenance. (Abstract 15, 16, 37-43, 50, 51) 
10 
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Thus, the element of "public use" required before 
a finding of dedication can be made is not present in 
the case at bar according to Utah law. The use argued 
by the respondents falls into the categories of "punctu-
ated permissive use" or use by those having "special 
and private interests in the road" and as such does not 
meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 27-12-89 
(1953) for dedication. 
The presence of the second element necessary to 
show a dedication, the awareness of the appellants of the 
use of the road, is not contested. However, the presence 
of the third and most important element, the intent by 
the landowner to grant the highway to the public for 
public use, is definitely missing. 
The element of intent is the most crucial element 
in the finding of a dedication of private property to 
public use. The taking of private property "should 
not be regarded lightly." Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 
2d 140, 143, 417 P.2d 646, 638 (1966). 
"The presumption is in favor of the property 
owner; and the burden of establishing public use 
for the required period of time is on those 
claiming it. The mere fact that members of the 
public may use a private driveway or alley with-
out interference will not necessarily establish 
it was a public way; nor will the fact that it was 
shown on the public records to be a public street; 
nor even that it had been paved and sign-posted 
as a public street by the city." Id. at 143, 648. 
"The taking of the property must be proved by clear 
and convincing evidence that constitutionally must 
U 
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be justified . . ." Peterson v. Combe, supra at 380, 548. 
The court in Peterson v. Combe reversed the trial 
court's finding of dedication even though recognizing 
the rule that on review facts are to be read in the light 
most favorable to the arbiter. Id. at 378, 546. The Court 
reasoned that when the "favorable review" clashes with 
individual property rights such rights cannot be treated 
lightly. Id. With this principle in mind, appellants 
submit that a review of the facts and the lower court's 
decision will show that the lower court erred in finding 
a dedication and that no such intent on the part of the 
appellants ever existed. 
A review of the facts show: that the use of the road 
was only with the permission of the appellants; that 
such use was infrequent and for private purposes; that 
in fact the appellants constructed and maintained for 
many years a gate across the road, such gate being torn 
down improperly by the county just recently; and, 
that such gate was often locked and appellants main-
tained a ' 'private property - No Trespassing" sign on 
the gate for over forty years; and, that there is no intent 
of the appellants expressly or implied to dedicate the 
road. 
This Honorable Court should consider the motives 
of the respondents in their attempt to make this road 
public. One of the respondents, an area landowner, 
desires that the cost for maintaining the road which 
gives him access to an infrequently used shed on his 
property, be paid by the county, instead of by himself 
12 
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and the other landowners in interest. (Abstract 21, 
30) The respondent County desires that the road be 
considered public since they are allocated considerable 
funds by the State Road Commission to maintain such 
roads. Such funding naturally creates a larger payroll 
for County employees and money for County coffers. 
Appellants do not wish to condemn the respondents 
for pursuing their own interests, but it is submitted 
that such self-interest should be recognized. And, that 
when weighing the facts and arguments in this case, 
the principle of the sanctity of private property should 
be observed and the respondents should be strictly 
required to meet their burden of proof in establishing 
the elements necessary for dedication. Appellants sub-
mit that a review of the facts show such burden has 
not been met. 
And finally, appellants submit that the public need 
for declaring the South Fork of Chalk Creek a public 
right-of-way be considered. While this consideration 
is not expressly mentioned in the dedication statute, 
Utah Code Ann. 27-12-89 (1953), it is implied. See 
Chournos v. Bell, supra. Presently there is no need 
to make Chalk Creek a public road. I t is not an access 
to public lands nor does it lead to other public roads 
which are such an access. (Abstract 52, 53, 57-61) 
In fact, the part of the Chalk Creek Road beyond the 
Newton-Oswald gate is presently a private road mean-
ing public travel would be halted there if not at the 
beginning of the part presently disputed. If in the 
13 
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future the County foresees a need for a public road 
through these private lands such a need can be met 
under their Eminent Domain authority. Such a con-
demnation proceeding would also be more just than 
the present efforts to take appellants' property. But, 
until such need is shown, appellants submit that the cir-
cumstances of this case require that the lower court's 
decision be reversed and the South Fork of Chalk Creek 
Road from the west boundary of Section 10 to the 
Newton-Oswald gate remain a private road. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D W H E N I T IN-
C R E A S E D T H E SIZE OF T H E D I S P U T E D 
P A R T OF SOUTH F O R K O F C H A L K C R E E K 
ROAD ( I F D E D I C A T E D TO T H E P U B L I C ) 
TO F O R T Y - F O U R F E E T . 
In finding that Chalk Creek Road had become a 
public right-of-way from State Route 133 to the New-
ton-Oswald gate, the lower Court increased the width 
of the road over the disputed section from some 15 
to 20 feet to forty-four (44) feet. This will necessitate 
a widening of the present road and a taking of a 
considerable number of acres of appellants' property. 
Such a taking of private property was authorized by 
the lower court without the exercise of the County's 
Eminent Domain authority and just compensation. 
Such action is improper because it violates Article One 
# 22 of the Utah Constitution which states: "Private 
14 
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property shall not be taken or damaged for public use 
without just compensation." Appellants submit that if 
the disputed part of Chalk Creek Road is held a public 
right-of-way by this Court that just compensation 
should be paid to the appellants as determined by the 
Court or by the County after condemnation proceed-
ings. Appellants also submit that the lower court erred 
in arbitrarily setting the width of the disputed part of 
Chalk Creek Road at forty-four feet instead of retain-
ing the present width. Appellants will argue this second 
point first. 
While it is clear according to Utah law that the 
width of rights-of-way for public highways is to be 
determined by highway authorities, Utah Code Ann. 
27-12-93 (1953), such a determination should be 
made by "what was reasonable and necessary, under 
all the facts and circumstances, for the uses which 
were made of the road." Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 
U. 1, 8, 116 P.2d 420, 423 (1941). The use claimed 
by the respondents of the disputed portion of Chalk 
Creek Road does not demand a wider road than pres-
ently exists. Until the respondents can demonstrate 
that a wider road is necessary appellants submit that 
the road should remain at its present width. See, 
Lindsay Land and Live Stock Company v. Chournos, 
75 Utah 384, 392, 285 P . 646, 649 (1929). Again, if 
in the future some new use is made of the road requiring 
a greater width, then the County has its Eminent 
Domain authority with which it can appropriately 
widen the road. 
15 
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Appellants' main contention is that the lower 
court has taken private property without providing 
the appellants means by which they can be justly com-
pensated. Under such circumstances appellants submit 
that they have a right to ask the Court in equity to 
grant such compensation. 
"We are of opinion that where private prop-
erty is taken or damaged for public use, as is 
alleged in the complaint in the injunction suit, 
without any agreement with the owner for com-
pensation, and without any proceedings for 
assessment in the manner provided by the statute 
relating to eminent domain, a court of equity 
may properly take jurisdiction where the only 
remedy remaining to the landowner is to present 
a claim to the Board of Examiners." 
State, by State Road Commission v. District Court, 
Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah County, 94 
Utah 384, 396 78 P.2d 502, 508 (1937). Such a pro-
cedure is the only relief presently available to the 
appellants. The appellants are apparently barred from 
suing the Road Commission to recover damages under 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Springville Bank-
ing Company v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 102, 349 
P.2d 157, 158 (1960). While certain Utah Supreme 
Court decisions have held that Article One Section 22 
of the Utah Constitution is self-executing thus con-
stituting authorization by the State to be sued, State 
by State Road Commission supra; Kimball v. Salt 
Lake County, 32 Utah 253, 260, 90 Pac. 395, 397 
(1907); and Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 
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224, 120 P . 503, 504 (1911), in the recent case of 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 
P.2d 105 (1960), the Court held that "Article I, Sec. 
22 of our Constitution is not self-executing, nor does 
it give consent to be sued, implied or otherwise . 
Id. at 419, 106. The dissent in Springville Banking 
Company v. Burton, supra, and an answer to the dis-
sent in the same case have exhausted the major argu-
ments for and against the interpretation that Art. I , 
Sec. 22 is self-executing permitting the state to be sued. 
However, appellants submit that this Court has rec-
ognized that where the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
and the provisions of Art. I, Sec. 22 are in contention, 
that the rights of the citizen must be maintained. 
"We think if a case arises where there is no 
other method of enforcing a constitutional right 
except by suit against the State, then it must 
be considered that the State has given its con-
sent to be sued in such a case." 
State by State Road Commission, supra at 399, 509. 
And further, quoting from a West Virginia case, 
"We recognize that the constitutional inhibi-
tion against taking private property for a public 
use without just compensation is of equal dig-
nity with the inhibition against suing the state. 
If necessasy to maintain the rights of a citizen 
under the former, the two provisions would be 
construed together and the former treated as an 
exception to the latter" Id. (emphasis supplied) 
While it is stated in the answer to t he dissent in 
Springville Banking Company, supra, that this Court 
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has rejected the theory of the implied consent to be 
sued when sovereign immunity conflicts with consti-
tutional property rights, Id. at 116, 168, the Utah 
Supreme Court actually said in the State by State Road 
Commission, supra, case that it was only unnecessary 
to permit suit against the state because the "Road 
Commissioners could be individually enjoined from 
proceeding in any manner forbidden by the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 399, 509. Thus, the Court up until the 
case of Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, supra, had 
apparently not rejected the right of a property owner 
whose property was taken without compensation to sue 
the Road Commission under Art. I, Sec. 22 of the 
Utah Constitution. Clearly earlier Utah cases have held 
that Art. I Sec. 22 standing by itself gave sufficient 
authority for the recovery of damages. Webber v Salt 
Lake County, supra, at 224, 504. 
In conclusion, prior to the case of Fairclough v. 
Salt Lake County, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
held the position that Art. I, Sec. 22 was not a right 
given to the citizens which they were powerless to 
enforce. Where no other means were available, Art. I , 
Sec. 22, provided sufficient authority under which to 
sue the State officials or agencies. State, by State Road 
Commission, supra, at 399, 509. 
Appellants submit that the correct interpretation 
of Art. I, Sec. 22, is that enunciated in the case of 
State, by State Road Commission, supra, that where 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity would bar any relief 
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to a deserving appellant, Art I, Sec. 22 should be con-
strued as an exception to the sovereign immunity. To 
hold otherwise would produce the result that the fram-
ers of the Constitution did intend to give the rights 
granted in Section 22, and then leave the citizen power-
less to enforce such rights. Such an interpretation 
would contradict this court's well reasoned case deci-
sions. Id. at 397, 508. 
In the event that this Court decides not to modify 
the holding in Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, supra, 
and permit the appellants to recover damages from 
the responsible State officials for the taking of their 
property to widen Chalk Creek Road, then appellants 
request this Court to exercise its power in equity and 
grant a just relief. In such a case appellants submit 
that equity should be involved because the actions of 
respondents in securing appellants' land was done arbi-
trarily and unreasonably. Eminent Domain proceedings 
should have been brought to acquire the additional land 
to widen the road. Thus, under the doctrine stated in 
State, by State Road Commission, supra, "that a court 
of equity may properly take jurisdiction where the only 
remedy remaining to the landowner is to present a 
claim to the Board of Examiners," Id. at 396, 508, and 
reaffirmed in Springville Banking Company v. Burton, 
supra, that " . . . principles of equity no doubt could 
be invoked to prevent threatened action of such char-
acter . . . " Id. at 103, 158, 159, appellants request 
that a just and equitable compensation be determined 
to pay them for the land taken to widen the road. 
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P O I N T I I I 
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N F I N D I N G 
T H A T T H E A P P E L L A N T S O B S T R U C T E D 
T H E ROAD J U S T S O U T H O F T H E K E I T H 
B L O N Q U I S T R E S I D E N C E A N D I N GRANT-
I N G R E S P O N D E N T S $500 D A M A G E S BE-
CAUSE T H E OBSTRUCTIONS, F E N C E 
P O S T S , W E R E NOT P L A C E D ON T H E ROAD 
B U T A L O N G I T A N D D I D NOT OBSTRUCT 
A N Y R E A S O N A B L E USE O F T H E ROAD. 
After County officials tore down the Blonquist 
Gate and replaced it with a cattle guard, the appel-
lants suffered the loss of livestock due to their getting 
caught in said cattle guard. To try and remedy this 
problem the appellants started construction of a fence 
just south of the Keith Blonquist residence to run to 
the cattle guard. The purpose of this fence was to 
channel livestock approaching the cattle guard and 
prevent crowding which was causing the livestock to 
get caught in the cattle guard. This road area before 
the cattle guard was 44 feet wide, its wideness a result 
of its being used as a stopping place for livestock driven 
along the road in earlier years. Fence posts were placed 
reducing the width of this area from 44 feet to about 
30 feet. However, before any wire could be strung or 
other connection made between fence posts the appel-
lants were forced to discontinue the fence construction. 
The posts were left and remain standing there today. 
At trial the respondents conplained that these posts 
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caused them to suffer damages in using the road. Spe-
cifically it was alleged that the posts caused snow to 
build up and out onto the road and made entry and 
exit to and from Keith Blonquist's property difficult. 
Also it was alleged that the posts hindered county 
equipment from properly grading and caring for the 
road. The lower court determined that as a result of 
the fence posts the respondents suffered damages in 
the amount of $500. 
Appellants submit that the lower court's deter-
mination is in error. Appellants certainly had the right 
to place a fence between their property and the road 
to try and control livestock and prevent further in-
juries. While there is legal authority to the effect that 
it is unlawful to obstruct highways, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 27-12-138 (1963), such prohibition clearly applies to 
obstructions on the highway. 
. . . but no such vehicles, building material or 
other obstructions shall be permitted to remain 
on any such highway contrary to instructions 
from the board of county commissioners, . . . 
Id. (Emphasis supplied) 
As appellants' exhibit number Twenty-One shows, the 
fence posts erected by them were not on the road but 
along it. Further, the width of the road where the fence 
posts were placed was still wider than the road before 
and beyond this area. Although by erecting the fence 
posts entry and exit in and from the Keith Blonquist 
may have been less convenient, appellants submit that 
it was not made unreasonably difficult. And, while 
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after the erection of the fence posts snow may have 
drifted out onto the road, this was a problem all up 
and down the road and appellants should not be penal-
ized for a common occurrance of nature. 
The erection of the fence was the only reasonable 
alternative left to the appellants to try and protect 
their livestock after the County tore down their gate and 
replaced it with a cattle guard. The inconvenience 
suffered by the respondents was not a deliberate act 
of the appellants, but only a result of their reasonable 
effort to protect their livestock. 
CONCLUSION 
In order for a private road to be dedicated to the 
public as a public thoroughfare under Utah Code Ann. 
27-12-89 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court has re-
quired that there be actual public use of the road, that 
the owner must be aware of such use, and that the owner 
must have intended to grant the road to the public. 
Appellants have shown that there has been no public 
use of the road as defined by Utah law. Just as in the 
case of Peterson v. Combe, supra, the public use claimed 
by the respondents does not meet the standards of 
public use required for a dedication. The use of the 
road by area landowners is not a public use. The use 
of the road by hunters was shown to have been paid 
for by them and with the permission of the appellants 
and respondents. Also the infrequent use of the road 
by fishermen was with the permission of the land-
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owners. Most importantly, the South Fork of Chalk 
Creek Road does not lead to public or government 
owned land. Thus, as in the Peterson case, there is no 
public allure or other reason to open this road up to 
the public. 
Besides showing that the road has not been used 
by the public according to the standards set by law, 
the appellants have also shown that while they were 
necessarily aware that the road was used by area land-
owners and sportsmen with their permission, such use 
was not permitted with the intention that the road 
become a public thoroughfare. Rather, it was a neigh-
borly but restricted accommodation. Most indicative 
of appellants' intent to keep the road private is the gate 
and "no trespasing-private property" signs erected by 
the appellants for the major part of this century. 
Appellants also submit that in the event that the 
disputed part of Chalk Creek Road is dedicated to the 
public, the lower court erred in increasing the width 
of the road from some 15-20 feet to 44 feet. First, there 
has been no showing that such increase in width is 
necessary. The past, present, and expected future use 
of the road does not support the increase in width. 
Second, if the road width is to be increased, now or in 
the future, it should be done under the Eminent Domain 
authority of the State. The lower court's action in 
widening the road places appellants in the difficult 
position of not being able to sue in a court of law to 
recover damages or require the County officials to 
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bring Eminent Domain proceedings according to recent 
Utah case holdings. Appellants therefore pray that 
this Court in equity grant them reasonable damages 
for the taking of their property by the widening of the 
road. 
Lastly, appellants submit that the awarding of 
damages to the respondents by the lower court was in 
error. The appellants in starting the construction of 
a fence were acting reasonably and responsibly in an 
effort to protect their livestock. The inconvenience to 
the respondents was forced upon the appellants by the 
County's actions in tearing down the Blonquist Gate 
and installing a dangerous cattle guard. 
Appellants pray that the lower court's decision 
be reversed and they be permitted to maintain the road 
as a private road or recover a just compensation for 
the taking of their property. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W I L L I A M J . CAYIAS and 
D. E U G E N E L I V I N G S T O N 
Attorneys for Appellants 
405 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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